

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

Case No. 2:16-cv-02268-MMD-GWF

## ORDER

**Re: Motion to Proceed in [Pseudonym]  
(ECF No. 49)**

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Proceed in Pseduonym (sic) (ECF No. 49), filed on July 6, 2017. Defendants filed their Response (ECF No. 54) on July 11, 2017, and Plaintiffs filed their Response (ECF No. 57) on July 25, 2017. The Court conducted a hearing in this matter on August 4, 2017.

## **BACKGROUND**

The Plaintiffs, “Randi Alexander” and “Jackson Young,” are suing under pseudonyms. “Randi Alexander” is a pen name for an individual romance novelist. “Jackson Young” is a stage name for an individual professional model and country music performer. *Complaint* (ECF No. 1), pg. 1, n. 1. Plaintiffs allege that they have been defamed by Defendants Kathryn Falk, Romantic Times, Inc. and Jane Doe/Gracie Wilson.<sup>1</sup> According to the complaint, Randi Alexander is a renowned author of romance novels and Jackson Young is a well-known model who poses for various depictions of romance

<sup>1</sup>Defendant Jane Doe/Gracie Wilson is a citizen of Canada. “Jane Doe” and “Gracie Wilson” are also pseudonyms for this individual. She was served with the summons and complaint in Ontario on November 9, 2016. *See Proof of Service* (ECF No. 17). Defendant Jane Doe/Gracie Wilson did not file an answer and her default was entered on December 28, 2016. *Clerk’s Entry of Default* (ECF No. 20). She has since been deposed in this action.

1 novels and themes, and is also an up-and-coming country music entertainer. *Id.* at ¶¶ 18-20. Defendant  
2 Wilson is also a romance author. Defendant Falk is a romance novel promoter and the chief executive  
3 officer of Romantic Times, Inc. which publishes a magazine specializing in romance novels and related  
4 book reviews. Defendant Falk and Romantic Times have substantial involvement and influence in the  
5 romance novel market and host the annual RT Booklovers Convention, which was held at the Rio Hotel  
6 & Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada between April 12 and 17, 2016. *Id.* at ¶¶ 22-25.

7 Plaintiffs allege that during the April 2016 convention, Defendants Wilson, Falk and Romantic  
8 Times began or continued a malicious campaign to defame and disparage Alexander and Young. Falk  
9 and Wilson allegedly made false statements to a group of convention attendees, including romance novel  
10 authors and publishers, that: (a) Alexander and Young were involved in secret, inappropriate, illicit,  
11 salacious, and scandalous relationships with each other and third parties; (b) were blackmailing  
12 publishers and others into using and promoting Plaintiffs' goods and services; (c) Young was a predator;  
13 (d) Wilson was living in fear because of Young's threats to her; (e) Young had other victims; (f) Young  
14 sent inappropriate text messages to various authors, including a big name author whose husband became  
15 aware of texts and made threats against Young; (g) Young fraudulently obtained money from authors for  
16 services he did not perform; and (h) Young was blackmailing Alexander by using details of their  
17 supposed inappropriate relationship to keep her in a business partnership. *Id.* at ¶¶ 26-28.

18 Plaintiffs allege that the defamatory campaign continued after the convention. Wilson allegedly  
19 posted defamatory statements about Alexander and Young on Facebook, purportedly confirming the  
20 rumors spread at the convention. Wilson stated that Young was a predator and she was in fear of him.  
21 An employee of Romantic Times spread Young's name via private messages as a predator. Wilson also  
22 allegedly made statements implying that Young was the person who had assaulted her outside her home  
23 in October 2015. *Id.* at ¶¶ 29-37. Plaintiff Young alleges that as a result of the Defendants' defamation  
24 campaign, promoters of concerts cancelled his scheduled appearances or informed him that they would  
25 no longer have an association with him. A book publisher also cancelled a photo shoot with Young,  
26 allegedly as a result of defamatory statements made by Defendant Falk. Young alleges that due to the  
27 fallout, he was forced to shut down his social media and website. *Id.* at ¶¶ 38-44. Plaintiff Alexander  
28 alleges that her reputation has suffered as well, and that she has lost out on business contracts,

1 relationships and opportunities. *Id.* at ¶ 46. Plaintiffs allege claims for violation of the Lanham Act-  
2 Trade Libel/Commercial Disparagement, Lanham Act-False Advertising, common law business  
3 disparagement/trade libel, defamation, false light, intentional interference with contractual relations and  
4 prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of  
5 emotional distress, fraud/deceptive trade practices, and civil conspiracy.

6 Plaintiffs request permission to continue to prosecute this action under their professional  
7 pseudonyms because they fear that if their true names are disclosed to Defendants or become publicly  
8 known, they will be subjected to harassment and abuse touching on their personal lives which they have  
9 kept separate from their professional identities and activities. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs have  
10 submitted exhibits showing comments posted on the Romantic Times Facebook account in early May,  
11 2016 in response to a post from an individual who stated that “a certain cover-model has been removed  
12 from the group due to multiple allegations of abuse and blackmail. Anyone feeling the need to jump to  
13 his defense can certainly do so but I’m not letting him back in.” The responses included a May 3, 2016  
14 post from Defendant Falk which stated that Plaintiff Young was banned from any RT events. The other  
15 posts in this exhibit were made on May 3 and 4, 2016. *Reply* (ECF No. 57), *Exhibit B*.

16 Plaintiff also attached posts from the Facebook account of Defendant Wilson made in early May  
17 2016 setting forth the manner in which she had allegedly been harassed by Plaintiff Young. The  
18 comments in response to Defendant’s Wilson’s posts also appear to have been made in early May 2016.  
19 *Id.* at *Exhibit F*. In March 2017, Defendant Wilson posted a request for donations to help her retain  
20 counsel to defend this lawsuit. *Id.* at *Exhibit A*. In that post, Defendant Wilson repeated allegations that  
21 she had previously made against the Plaintiff Young in May 2016. This post drew several contributions  
22 from individuals who indicated their sympathy and support for Defendant Wilson.

23 On August 7, 2017, the Court entered a stipulated interim protective order which authorizes  
24 Plaintiffs’ counsel to disclose Plaintiffs’ true names and other personal identifying information to  
25 Defendant’s counsel, on an “attorney’s eyes only” basis, to facilitate obtaining relevant documents and  
26 information during discovery. Defendants’ counsel, however, is precluded from providing Plaintiffs’  
27 true names and personal identification information to his clients or the public pending a decision on the  
28 instant motion. *See Order* (ECF No. 62).

1                    **DISCUSSION**

2                 A plaintiff's use of a fictitious name runs afoul of the public's common law right of access to  
 3 judicial proceedings and the requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a) that the complaint include the names of  
 4 all the parties. *Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textiles*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Advanced  
 5 Textiles") (citing *Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.* 435 U.S. 589, 598-99, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (1978)  
 6 and *EEOC v. Erection Co., Inc.*, 900 F.2d 168, 169 (9th Cir. 1990)). In *Doe v. Kamehameha  
 7 Schools/Pauahi Bishop Estate*, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010), the court stated that "[t]he normal  
 8 presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names. . . . This presumption is loosely related  
 9 to the public's right to open courts, . . . and the right of private individuals to confront their accusers. . . ."  
 10 *Id.* (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has also stated that Rule 10(a) "protects the public's  
 11 legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties. . . . This  
 12 creates a strong presumption in favor of parties' proceeding in their own names. Defendants have the  
 13 right to know who their accusers are, as they may be subject to embarrassment or fundamental unfairness  
 14 if they do not." *Plaintiff B. v. Francis*, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks  
 15 and citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit also quoted *Doe v. Smith*, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005),  
 16 in which the plaintiff sued her ex-boyfriend for illegally distributing a videotape of them having sex  
 17 when the plaintiff was a minor. The Seventh Circuit noted that plaintiff had denied defendant the shelter  
 18 of anonymity in bringing her lawsuit, and "yet it is [defendant], and not the plaintiff who faces disgrace  
 19 if the complaint's allegations can be substantiated. And if the complaint's allegations are false, then  
 20 anonymity provides a shield behind which defamatory charges may be launched without shame or  
 21 liability."

22                 Courts have nevertheless permitted parties to proceed anonymously when special circumstances  
 23 justify secrecy. *Advanced Textiles*, 214 F.3d at 1067. A party may be permitted to use a pseudonym "in  
 24 the 'unusual case' when nondisclosure of the party's identity 'is necessary . . . to protect a person from  
 25 harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.'" *Id.* at 1068-69. The court must balance the  
 26 need for anonymity against the general presumption that parties' identities are public information and the  
 27 risk of unfairness to the opposing party. *Id.* (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have been permitted to use  
 28 pseudonyms in three situations: (1) when identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental

1 harm; (2) when anonymity is necessary to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal  
 2 nature; or (3) when the anonymous party is compelled to admit his or her intention to engage in criminal  
 3 conduct and thereby risk criminal prosecution. *Id.* (citations omitted).

4 In cases where a pseudonym is used to shield the anonymous party from retaliation, the district  
 5 court should determine the need for anonymity by evaluating the following factors: (1) the severity of the  
 6 threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party's fears; and (3) the anonymous party's  
 7 vulnerability to such retaliation. *Advanced Textiles*, 214 F.3d at 1068. As examples of plaintiffs who  
 8 are particularly vulnerable to retaliation, the court referenced children plaintiffs or a prison inmate who  
 9 served as a government witness. *Id.* (citing *Doe v. Stegall*, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) and *United*  
 10 *States v. Doe*, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) ("*Doe II*"). The court further stated:

11 The court must also determine the precise prejudice at each stage of  
 12 proceedings to the opposing party, and whether proceedings may be  
 13 structured so as to mitigate that prejudice. *See James*, 6 F.3d at 240-41  
 14 (evaluating defendant's assertions that plaintiffs' use of pseudonyms  
 15 would prejudice the jury against the defendants and would impair  
 16 defendant's ability to impeach plaintiff's credibility). Finally, the court  
 17 must decide whether the public's interest in the case would be best served  
 18 by requiring that the litigants reveal their identities. *See Stegall*, 653 F.2d  
 19 at 185 (recognizing that "[p]arty anonymity does not obstruct the public's  
 20 view of the issues joined or the court's performance in resolving them.").

21 We recognize that the balance between a party's need for anonymity and  
 22 the interests weighing in favor of open judicial proceedings may change as  
 23 the litigation progresses. In cases where the plaintiffs have demonstrated a  
 24 need for anonymity, the district court should use its powers to manage  
 25 pretrial proceedings, *see* FED R.Civ.P. 16(b), and to issue protective  
 26 orders limiting disclosure of the party's name, *see* FED.R.CIV.P. 26(c), to  
 27 preserve the party's anonymity to the greatest extent possible without  
 28 prejudicing the opposing party's ability to litigate the case. It may never  
 be necessary, however, to disclose the anonymous parties' identities to  
 nonparties to the suit.

214 F.3d at 1068-69.

22 The plaintiffs in *Advanced Textiles* brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)  
 23 alleging that they were denied overtime pay and were subjected to excessive deductions for unsanitary  
 24 housing and food that they were required to purchase as a condition of employment. The plaintiffs were  
 25 Chinese nationals working on labor contracts in the garment industry in Saipan. They alleged that they  
 26 would be subjected to severe retaliation by the Chinese government and their employers if their true  
 27 identities were revealed. The court concluded that "based on the extreme nature of the retaliation  
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1 threatened against plaintiffs coupled with their highly vulnerable status, the plaintiffs reasonably fear  
2 severe retaliation, and that this fear outweighs the interests in favor of open judicial proceedings.” The  
3 court also held that at that early stage of the litigation, the defendants would not be prejudiced by not  
4 knowing the identities of the plaintiffs. *Id.* at 1069.

5 In *Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Pauahi Bishop Estate*, four minor plaintiffs sought to proceed  
6 anonymously in a lawsuit challenging the defendants’ allegedly race-based school admissions policies.  
7 The plaintiffs argued that they reasonably feared physical injury if their identities were revealed. They  
8 pointed to a number of threatening comments made against plaintiffs and attorneys in prior related cases,  
9 as well as comments directed at them and their attorneys. 596 F.3d at 1040. The magistrate judge  
10 denied the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed anonymously. He found that threats in previous lawsuits were  
11 not directed toward the children plaintiffs and that internet comments were not threats, but merely  
12 voiced the commentators’ frustrations with the lawsuit. He also discounted comments suggesting that  
13 the plaintiffs would be injured at school. The magistrate judge found that plaintiffs’ evidence, at most,  
14 suggested that the children might be socially ostracized which did not warrant granting the motion to  
15 proceed anonymously. After newspapers published stories on the magistrate judge’s order, numerous  
16 comments were made on the newspapers’ forums, some of which also contained threats. *Id.* at 1041.  
17 The plaintiffs’ attorney also received threatening calls. *Id.* Based on this additional evidence, the  
18 plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider the magistrate judge’s order. The district judge, however,  
19 upheld the magistrate’s denial of the motion.

20 The Ninth Circuit stated that it was required to affirm the order, unless it concluded that the  
21 district court relied on an erroneous view of the law, made a clearly erroneous assessment of the  
22 evidence, or struck an unreasonable balance of the relevant factors. *Id.* at 1042. The court noted that  
23 application of the *Advanced Textile* factors was “quite difficult, particularly in light of the controversy  
24 surrounding the case.” Under the first factor, concerning the public interest in open judicial proceedings,  
25 the court addressed the defendants’ argument that their ability to challenge the plaintiffs’ standing to  
26 bring the lawsuit would be impaired if they were permitted to proceed anonymously. The court stated  
27 that “[a]lthough standing is of paramount importance to plaintiffs’ ability to sue, it is certainly not the  
28 main issue in the public’s eye. And with such a large applicant pool, the court will most likely be able to

1 discuss most aspects of an individual's application without revealing the individual plaintiff's identity."  
 2 *Id.* at 1043. The court noted that there was also a public interest in seeing that the case was decided on  
 3 its merits which would be furthered by allowing the plaintiffs to proceed anonymously.

4 The outcome of the motion came down to the two most important factors—the severity of the  
 5 threatened harm and the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fears. *Id.* The plaintiffs primarily feared  
 6 physical harm if their identities were revealed. The court stated that these threats were undoubtedly  
 7 severe, and there were several factors that militated in favor of finding that the plaintiffs' fears were  
 8 reasonable. *Id.* at 1044-45. Nevertheless, the court found that the district court did not abuse its  
 9 discretion in concluding that plaintiffs' fears of physical harm were unreasonable. The court stated that  
 10 "[t]he magistrate judge correctly recognized that many times people say things anonymously on the  
 11 internet that they would never say in another context and have no intention of carrying out." *Id.* at 1045.  
 12 The plaintiffs had culled only a few comments out of hundreds of anonymous comments regarding the  
 13 case, many of which were accompanied by statements supporting nonviolence. The district court also  
 14 correctly evaluated the plaintiffs' concession that they were not fearful of retaliation or ostracism if they  
 15 were admitted to the school. *Id.* Although the court found that the district court did not abuse its  
 16 discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion, it also stated that "[h]ad the district court found that  
 17 anonymity was appropriate, we likely would have concluded that the district court did not abuse its  
 18 discretion. Or, were we permitted to make findings and weigh the factors anew, we might have held that  
 19 anonymity here was appropriate." *Id.* at 1046.

20 In *Plaintiff B. v. Francis*, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the type of case in which anonymity is  
 21 alleged to be necessary to preserve the plaintiff's privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal  
 22 nature. The female plaintiffs were videotaped by defendants' agents exposing their breasts and/or  
 23 engaging in sexual conduct with each other. The plaintiffs were minors at the time the videos were shot.  
 24 Some of the plaintiffs alleged that they were improperly induced into engaging in the conduct and giving  
 25 signed consents to use the videos. The district court had permitted the plaintiffs to proceed anonymously  
 26 up to the time of trial. Prior to trial, however, the court entered an order that plaintiffs would not be  
 27 allowed to remain anonymous at trial. This decision was based, in part, on the district court's concern  
 28 regarding violation of the news media's and public's First Amendment rights. In reversing the district

1 court's order and remanding the issue for further consideration, the Eleventh Circuit noted that  
2 "Plaintiffs had put on a convincing case that, by being identified, they will be permanently linked with  
3 the videos containing footage of them." 631 F.3d at 1318. The court noted that certain websites would  
4 probably list the plaintiffs as the "stars" of these videos. The court cited the case of another plaintiff  
5 who sued the same defendants in her true name and as a result was "permanently" identified in a website  
6 as the "17-year-old public breast flasher," and the video could still be purchased from private sellers on  
7 Amazon.com. *Id.* The court also stated that the defendants would not be harmed by permitting  
8 plaintiffs to proceed anonymously. The defendants had already been convicted of criminal violations  
9 related to the videos. They were also aware of plaintiffs' true identities and "were not barred from  
10 conducting a full range of discovery in building a defense for trial." *Id.* at 1318-19.

11 In *Doe v. Smith*, the Seventh Circuit was also faced with the issue of whether anonymity was  
12 necessary to preserve the plaintiff's privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature. In that  
13 case the court reversed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The court stated that  
14 on remand, the court would have to revisit the issue of whether plaintiff should be allowed to proceed  
15 anonymously. The court noted that plaintiff was a minor when the recording occurred, but was an adult  
16 at the time of the lawsuit. It also noted that "[e]veryone at the high school who saw the recording  
17 already knows who 'Doe' is." The court stated that "anonymity still could be justified if the tape had  
18 been circulated more widely . . . and disclosure would allow strangers to identify the person in the  
19 recording and thus add to her humiliation. That question should be addressed by the district court . . ."  
20 429 F.3d at 710.

21 In this case, Plaintiffs Alexander and Young do not allege fear of retaliatory physical injury if  
22 their true names are disclosed. The potential injury to Plaintiffs if their true names are publicly disclosed  
23 in this lawsuit is the reputational and emotional injury that they will suffer in their private lives, which  
24 have so far been shielded by their use of professional pseudonyms. This case differs from any of the  
25 foregoing cases, or other cases cited by the parties, in that the Plaintiffs are known to the Defendants,  
26 and to the romantic novel and musical performance communities in which the allegedly defamatory  
27 statements have been published, only by their professional pseudonyms. Plaintiff Young alleges that his  
28 ability to earn a livelihood as a professional model or country music entertainer under the name "Jackson

1 Young” has been damaged by Defendants’ allegedly defamatory statements. Plaintiff Alexander more  
2 generally and vaguely alleges that her reputation as the romance novelist “Randi Alexander” has been  
3 damaged by Defendants’ defamatory accusations and she has lost out on business contracts and  
4 relationships. The case for allowing Plaintiffs to proceed under their professional pseudonyms is  
5 strengthened by their allegation that Defendants stated that Plaintiffs engaged in an illicit, salacious and  
6 scandalous relationship with each other. Plaintiff Alexander is married, and this allegation if connected  
7 to her true name could cause injury to her reputation in the community where she is known by her true  
8 name. An accusation of marital infidelity is a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature. Although  
9 Plaintiff Young is apparently not married, he could also potentially suffer similar personal harm in his  
10 private life if this accusation is connected to his true name.

11 It is possible that persons who know Plaintiffs by their true names are also aware of their  
12 professional pseudonyms and therefore can or already have connected the allegations in this lawsuit to  
13 the Plaintiffs. If this is established, then the grounds for permitting Plaintiffs to proceed under their  
14 professional pseudonyms will diminish. At this point, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s representations that  
15 they have kept their actual identities separate from their professional identities.

16 Given that Plaintiffs are known to Defendants and the professional communities in which they  
17 have allegedly been defamed only by their professional pseudonyms, the public interest in requiring that  
18 Plaintiffs sue in their true names is not strong. Assuming that there may be some validity to Plaintiffs’  
19 allegations that they have been defamed, requiring them to sue in their true names would potentially  
20 spread the damaging effects of the defamation to the arena of their private lives where it has not yet  
21 reached. Defendants’ counsel had been provided with Plaintiffs’ true identities and is able to conduct  
22 discovery relevant to the claims in this case. If this case is not resolved prior to trial, it will be necessary  
23 for the Court to determine whether Plaintiffs should be required to publicly disclose their true names at  
24 trial. It is also possible that other developments will occur that warrant requiring Plaintiffs to proceed by  
25 their true names. Accordingly,

26 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Proceed in Pseduonym (sic)  
27 (ECF No. 49) is **granted** as follows: Plaintiffs may proceed with this action under their professional  
28 pseudonyms, and without disclosing their true names to the Defendants or the public, up to the time of

1 trial. Prior to trial, the Court will determine whether Plaintiffs should be required to publicly disclose  
2 their true names at trial.

3 DATED this 30th day of August, 2017.

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6 GEORGE FOLEY, JR.  
United States Magistrate Judge

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